Under external reference pricing (ERP) the price that a government permits a …rm to charge in its market depends upon the …rm's prices in other countries. In a twocountry (home and foreign) model where demand is asymmetric across countries, we show that home's unilaterally optimal ERP policy permits the home …rm to engage in a threshold level of international price discrimination above which it is (just) willing to export. If the …rm faces a price control abroad or bargains over price with the foreign government, an ERP policy can even yield higher home welfare than a direct price control.
Introduction
Governments across the world rely on a variety of price regulations to combat the market power of …rms selling patented pharmaceutical products. Two such commonly used regulations are external reference pricing (ERP) and price controls. Under a typical ERP policy, the price that a country permits a …rm to charge in its market for a particular product depends upon the …rm's prices for the same product in a well-de…ned set of foreign countries, commonly called the country's reference basket. 1 For example, Canada's ERP reference basket includes France, Germany, Italy, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK and the USA while While ERP policies a¤ect prices by restricting the degree of international price discrimination practised by …rms, governments can also directly control prices via a variety of other measures: for example, governments can control the ex-manufacturer price, the wholesale markup, the pharmacy margin, the retail price, or use some combination of these measures.
Though few countries, if any, use all such measures, many use at least some of them. For example, Kyle (2007) notes that price controls in the pharmaceutical market are common in most major European countries where governments are fairly involved in the health-care sector. Similarly, many developing countries have a long history of imposing price controls on patented pharmaceuticals, many of which tend to be supplied by foreign multinationals.
For example, India has been imposing price controls on pharmaceuticals since 1962 and, despite the existence of a robust domestic pharmaceutical industry, it recently chose to signi…cantly expand the list of drugs subject to price controls. 2 This paper addresses several inter-related questions pertaining to ERP policies that have not been tackled by existing literature: What are the underlying economic determinants 1 Thus the use of an ERP policy by a country can help lower the domestic price of a product only if the price that would have prevailed in its market in the absence of its ERP policy were to exceed prices in the set of reference countries. We address these questions in a simple model with two countries (home and foreign) where a single home …rm produces a patented product, that it potentially sells in both markets. The …rm enjoys monopoly status in both markets by virtue of its patent. The home market is assumed to have more consumers and a greater willingness to pay for the product, which in turn creates an incentive for the …rm to price discriminate in favor of foreign consumers. Home's ERP policy (where 1) is de…ned as the ratio of the …rm's domestic price to its foreign price and it is chosen by the home government to maximize national welfare, which equals the sum of the …rm's global pro…t and domestic consumer surplus. Under this formulation, if the …rm sells in both markets when facing the ERP policy at home then its equilibrium home price is simply times its foreign price.
From the …rm's perspective, home's ERP policy is a constraint on the degree of international price discrimination that it can practice while from the domestic government's perspective it is a tool for lowering the price at home (while simultaneously raising it abroad). 3 Since the domestic market is more lucrative for the …rm, too tight an ERP policy at home creates an incentive on its part to not sell abroad in order to sustain its optimal monopoly price at home. This is an important mechanism in our model and there is substantial empirical support for the idea that the use of ERP policies on the part of rich countries can deter …rms from serving low-price markets. For example, using data from that the delay e¤ect of a prior launch in a high-price EU country on a subsequent launch in a low-price EU country is stronger than the corresponding e¤ect of a prior launch in a low-price EU country. 4 3 In this sense, ERP policies are similar to exhaustion policies that determine whether or not holders of intellectual property rights (IPRs) are subject to competition from parallel imports when they choose to engage in international price discrimination. Unlike ERP policies, the economics of exhaustion policies has been investigated widely in the literature: see Malueg and Schwarz (1994) , Maskus (2000) , Richardson (2002) , Li and Maskus (2006) , Valletti (2006) , Grossman and Lai (2008) , and Roy and Saggi (2012). 4 Further evidence consistent with launch delay spurred by the presence of price regulations is provided
While the …rm only cares about its total global pro…t, home welfare also depends on the source of those pro…ts, i.e., it matters whether pro…ts come at the expense of domestic or foreign consumers. We …nd that the home country's unilaterally optimal ERP policy permits the …rm to engage in the minimum level of price discrimination at which the …rm just prefers selling in both markets to selling only at home. An important feature of this nationally optimal ERP policy is that the less lucrative the foreign market, the greater the room that the …rm is given to price discriminate internationally. Such an ERP policy is optimal from the perspective of home welfare because of the following trade-o¤. On the one hand, given that the …rm exports, home has an incentive to tighten its ERP policy to lower domestic price. On the other hand, tightening the ERP policy below the threshold level induces the …rm to drop the foreign market and home consumers end up facing the …rm's optimal monopoly price p m H . The outcome under which the …rm sells only at home is decidedly worse for the home country than one in which the …rm faces no ERP constraint whatsoever (and therefore necessarily sells in both markets) -while domestic consumers pay p m H under both scenarios, the …rm collects monopoly pro…ts abroad only in the latter scenario.
Though we model home's ERP policy as the extent to which the …rm is free to price discriminate in favor of foreign consumers, as we noted earlier, in the real world countries often implement ERP policies by requiring the local price charged by a …rm to be no higher than its prices in the set of countries that constitute its reference basket. Thus, the extent to which a …rm is constrained by a country's ERP policy is a function of the composition of its reference basket. Our simpler two-country formulation allows us to capture the essence of ERP policies in a manner that is not only tractable but also useful for understanding the structure of real-world ERP policies. Casual empiricism suggests that when de…ning their reference baskets, countries typically tend to include foreign countries with similar market sizes and per capita incomes. For example, we do not observe EU countries setting ERP policies on the basis of prices in low income developing countries. If lowering local prices were the sole motivation of ERP policies, European governments would have an incentive to use the lowest available foreign prices while setting their ERP policies. The insight provided by our model is that they choose not to do so because casting too wide a net while setting ERP policies can back…re by causing …rms to forsake foreign markets just so that they can sustain monopoly prices in their domestic markets.
by Kyle (2007) who uses data on 1444 drugs produced by 278 …rms in 134 therapeutic classes from 1980-1999 to study the pattern of drug launches in 21 countries.
We show that under home's unilaterally optimal ERP policy the equilibrium foreign price (p F ) ends up exceeding the …rm's optimal monopoly price p m F for that market (i.e. p F > p m F ). Given this outcome, we build on our benchmark ERP model by allowing the foreign government to impose a local price control p F on the …rm in order to curtail the international spillover generated by home's ERP policy. When both countries are policy active, home sets its ERP policy taking into account the incentives of not just the …rm but also the foreign country. We show that the tighter the home's ERP policy, the looser the foreign price control needs to be for the …rm to be willing to sell there. Indeed, home's ERP policy undermines the e¤ectiveness of the foreign price control since the minimum price at which the …rm is willing to sell abroad is higher when home has an ERP policy in place relative to when it does not. An interesting insight delivered by our analysis is that a tightening of the foreign price control p F can raise welfare in both countries (i.e. it can be Pareto-improving). This surprising result arises whenever p F 2 [p m F ; p F ] and the intuition for it is as follows. Whenever p F p m F a tightening of the foreign price control increases the …rm's foreign pro…t even as it reduces its domestic pro…t due to the foreign price control spilling over to the home market via its ERP policy. However, since the …rm's foreign pro…t is decreasing in p F for all
, only a moderate relaxation of home's ERP policy is required to ensure that the …rm continues to export if the foreign price control is tightened. As a result, whenever p F 2 [p m F ; p F ] a tightening of the foreign price control p F also lowers home price (which equals p F ). Thus, the existence of an ERP policy at home not only causes the foreign price control to spill over to the home market, the nature of the spillover is such that a tightening of the foreign price control can make both countries better o¤.
A central result of the paper is that when both countries are policy active, the equilibrium ERP policy of the home country is Pareto-e¢ cient and it results in the foreign country having to allow the …rm to charge its optimal monopoly price p m F in its market (which is lower than p F -the price that obtains abroad in the absence of the price control).
In addition, we show that the jointly-optimal ERP policy -i.e. the policy that maximizes the sum of home and foreign welfare -is more stringent than the ERP policy implemented by the home government (who does not take into account the adverse e¤ect of its ERP policy on foreign consumers).
In sub-section 4.1, we expand the menu of policies available to the home country by allowing it to choose between a domestic price control and an ERP policy. This analysis shows when and why an ERP policy dominates a price control. The key di¤erence between the two instruments is that, unlike an ERP policy, a domestic price control does not a¤ect the foreign price control facing the …rm and therefore has no bearing on its decision to export. Therefore, if home uses a price control as opposed to an ERP policy, foreign simply chooses the lowest price at which the …rm is willing to sell in its market (i.e. it sets its price control at the …rm's marginal cost thereby maximizing local consumer surplus and eliminating the …rm's foreign pro…t). On the other hand, if home institutes an ERP policy, a stricter foreign price control also leads to a lower home price (holding constant home's ERP policy) -something that tends to make exporting less attractive to the …rm.
Recognizing the link between prices in the two markets created by home's ERP policy and its impact on the …rm's incentives, the foreign government is unable to push down its price control all the way to the …rm's marginal cost when home's price regulation takes the form of an ERP policy as opposed to a price control. As a result, from the perspective of home welfare, the trade-o¤ between an ERP policy and a local price control boils down to the following: while a price control yields greater domestic surplus (de…ned as the sum of consumer surplus and …rm's home pro…t), an ERP policy helps the …rm earn greater pro…t abroad. Therefore, an ERP policy dominates a price control when maintaining the monopoly mark-up in the foreign market is important or, equivalently, when the pro…t earned from the foreign market accounts for a signi…cant component of the …rm's total pro…t -something that happens when demand in the foreign market is relatively similar in magnitude to that at home.
Since …rms selling patented products (such as in the pharmaceutical industry) often bargain with governments over prices of their products, in section 4.2 we consider Nash bargaining (both with and without side-payments) between the …rm and the foreign government over price. We derive optimal ERP policies under both scenarios and investigate their properties. A major result of this analysis is that the weaker the bargaining position of the …rm vis-à-vis the foreign government, the more likely it is that the home country prefers an ERP policy to a price control. This result can be viewed as a generalization of the core model since, after all, a foreign price control simply represents a scenario where all of the bargaining power resides with the foreign government.
By explicitly bringing in international pricing considerations and policy interaction between national governments, our paper makes an important contribution to the rapidly developing literature on the economics of internal reference pricing policies, i.e. policies under which drugs are clustered according to some equivalence criteria (such as chemical, pharmacological, or therapeutic) and a reference price within the same market is established for each cluster. Brekke et. al. (2007) analyze three di¤erent types of internal reference pricing in a model of horizontal di¤erentiation where two …rms sell brand-name drugs while the third …rm sells a generic version, that like in our model, is perceived to be of lower quality. They compare generic and therapeutic reference pricing -with each other and with the complete lack of reference pricing. 5 One of their important …ndings is that therapeutic reference pricing generates stronger competition and lower prices than generic reference pricing. whether or not reference pricing is endogenous -in the sense of being based on market prices as opposed to an exogenous benchmark price -matters a great deal since the behavior of generic producers is markedly di¤erent in the two scenarios; in particular, generic producers have an incentive to lower their prices when facing an endogenous reference pricing policy in order to lower the reference price, which in turn makes the policy preferable from the viewpoint of consumers. 7 Using a panel data set covering the 24 best selling o¤-patent molecules, they also empirically examine the consequences of a 2003 policy experiment where a sub-sample of o¤-patent molecules was subjected to reference pricing, with the rest remaining under price caps. They …nd that prices of both brand names and generics fell due to the introduction of reference pricing while the market shares of generics increased.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. We …rst introduce our two-country 5 Therapeutic clusters upon which reference pricing is based can be de…ned in several ways. As per Brekke et. al. (2007) , under generic reference pricing the cluster includes products that have the same active chemical ingredients whereas under therapeutic reference pricing the cluster includes products with chemically related active ingredients that are pharmacologically equivalent or have similar therapeutic e¤ects. While the cluster includes only o¤-patent brand-name drugs and generic substitutes under generic reference pricing, such is not necessarily the case under therapeutic reference pricing under which it may include on-patent drugs. 6 In similar spirit, Miraldo (2009) compares two di¤erent reference pricing policies in a two-period model of horizontal di¤erentiation: one where reference price is the minimum of the observed prices in the market and another where it is a linear combination of those prices. In the model, the reference pricing policy of the regulator responds to the …rst period prices set by …rms (which, in turn, the …rms take into account while setting their prices). The key result is that consumer surplus and …rm pro…ts are lower under the 'linear policy'since the …rst period price competition between …rms is less aggressive under this policy. 7 The Norwegian price cap regulation is an ERP policy where the reference basket is the following set of 'comparable'countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the UK. framework and analyze home's optimal ERP policy as well as its welfare implications.
Next, in section 3, we allow the foreign country to utilize a price control and study its interaction with home's ERP policy. Section 4 extends the main analysis in two important directions. First, we endogenize the home country's choice between an ERP policy and a domestic price control. Next, we study the role of ERP policy when the …rm and the foreign government bargain over price. We consider bargaining both with and without sidepayments. Section 5 concludes while section 6 constitutes the appendix where we present all of the supporting calculations and undertake two important extensions of our analysis:
in sub-section 6.2, we describe equilibrium outcomes when the two countries pick their respective policies simultaneously as well as when the foreign country moves …rst while in section 6.3 we consider a three-country model to derive one country's optimal ERP policy when it takes the form of a reference basket.
A benchmark model of ERP
We consider a world comprised of two countries: home (H) and foreign (F ). 8 A single home …rm sells a patented product (x) with a quality level s. Each consumer in country i From the …rm's viewpoint, the two markets di¤er from each other in two ways. First, home consumers value quality relatively more, that is, H = 1 = F . Second, the home market is larger: n H = n 1 = n F . As one might expect, since 1 the …rm has an incentive to price discriminate internationally. 9 The home government sets an external reference pricing (ERP) policy that stipulates 8 In the appendix, we derive home's optimal reference basket for the case of three countries. 9 We should note here that ERP policies are typically implemented at the national level and therefore may apply to a wide range of patented products whereas our model is focused on a single product. Furthermore, while the foreign country has no incentive to use an ERP policy in our model, in the real world two countries can simultaneously belong to each other's reference baskets. Such an outcome can be rationalized via a generalized multi-product version of our model if demand elasticities for some products are higher at home than abroad with the opposite being true for other products. Alternatively, an Armington type assumption wherein consumers in both countries place a higher value on home products could also create a potential role for an ERP policy.
the maximum price ratio that its …rm can set across countries. In particular, let p H and p F be prices in the home and foreign markets respectively given that the …rm sells in both countries. Then, home's ERP policy requires that the …rm's pricing abide by the following constraint:
where 1 re ‡ects the rigor of home's ERP policy. A more stringent ERP policy corresponds to a lower which gives the …rm less room for international price discrimination.
Due to di¤erences in the structure of demand across two countries, the …rm has no incentive to discriminate in favor of home consumers so there is no loss of generality in assuming 1. Note also that when = 1 home's ERP policy leaves the …rm no room to price discriminate across markets.
Pricing under the ERP constraint
If the ERP constraint is absent, the …rm necessarily sells in both markets since doing so yields higher total pro…t than selling only at home. In particular, when the …rm can freely choose prices across countries, it sets a market speci…c price in each country to maximize its global pro…t as follows
It is straightforward to show that the …rm's optimal monopoly prices in the two markets 
The sales associated with these prices can be recovered from the respective demand curves in the two markets and these equal
Provided the …rm sells in both markets, global sales under the ERP constraint equal
Using the above formulae, it is straightforward to show the following:
Lemma 1: Provided the …rm sells in both markets, the imposition of an ERP policy by the home country that leaves the …rm with some room to price discriminate internationally (i.e. > 1) but not complete freedom to do so (i.e. < ) leads to lower global sales relative to international price discrimination: 
As one might expect,
, that is, the …rm's global pro…t increases as home's ERP policy becomes looser.
Of course, the …rm always has the option to escape the ERP constraint by eschewing exports altogether. If it does so, it collects the optimal monopoly pro…t m H in the home market where
H is independent of , we can solve for the critical ERP policy above which the …rm prefers to sell in both markets relative to selling only at home. We have:
We refer to as the export inducing ERP policy. Observe that the export inducing ERP policy is increasing in the two basic parameters of the model (i.e. and n) since an increase in either of these parameters makes the home market relatively more pro…table for the …rm thereby making it more reluctant to export under the ERP constraint. As a result, the more lucrative the home market, the greater the room to price discriminate that the …rm requires in order to prefer selling in both markets to selling only at home.
The …rst main result can now be stated:
Proposition 1: (i) When facing the ERP constraint the …rm exports if and only if the ERP policy is less stringent than the export inducing ERP policy (i.e. ).
(ii) Given that the …rm sells in both markets when facing an ERP policy at home, the following hold: Proof: see appendix.
Part (iia) highlights that the introduction of an ERP policy at home moves prices in the two markets in opposite directions: it lowers the domestic price whereas it raises the foreign price. These price changes obviously imply that home's ERP policy makes domestic consumers better o¤ at the expense of foreign consumers. It is worth noting that home's ERP policy induces the …rm to raise its price above its optimal monopoly price p m F in the foreign market since it wants to avoid lowering the price in the more lucrative domestic market too much. Along the same lines, given that an ERP policy is in place at home and the …rm exports, a decrease in the stringency of this policy (i.e. an increase in ) makes foreign consumers better o¤. Thus, the use of an ERP policy by home generates a negative international spillover for foreign consumers, a theme to which we return below when analyzing the optimal ERP policy from a joint welfare perspective. 13 Part (iib) also captures the con ‡icting e¤ects of a tightening of home's ERP policy on the …rm and domestic consumers -a trade-o¤ that is at the heart of the welfare analysis that follows in section 2.2. Part (iic) highlights the fact that the international price linkage created by home's ERP policy makes prices in both markets a function of the two key home demand parameters (i.e. and n) that determine the pro…tability of the domestic market relative to the foreign one.
Optimal ERP policy
Having understood the …rm's pricing and export behavior, we are now in a position to derive home's optimal ERP policy. To do so, we assume that home's objective is to maximize its national welfare, i.e., the sum of local consumer surplus and total pro…t of the …rm:
where cs H (p H ) denotes consumer surplus in the home market and it equals
Since the …rm exports i¤ , domestic welfare as a function of the ERP policy can be written as:
The logic for why home welfare is discontinuous in its ERP policy is straightforward:
for , the …rm exports and domestic welfare equals the sum of the …rm's global pro…t G and local consumer surplus cs H whereas for < the …rm only sells at home at its optimal monopoly price and domestic welfare equals w
H . An important feature of our model is that provided the …rm exports, the tighter the ERP policy (i.e. the lower is ), the higher is home welfare: i.e. @w H =@ 0 if .
14 Thus, for all , the home government has an incentive to reduce . But once = , any further reduction in leads the …rm to eschew exports and home welfare drops from w H to w m H since the downward pressure on domestic price that is exerted by home's ERP policy disappears once the …rm decides to sell only at home. 15 We can directly state the main result:
Home's optimal ERP policy is e where e = 1 if otherwise
Observe that for home's optimal ERP policy calls for the …rm to set a common international price (i.e. e = 1) whereas for > , it permits some degree of international 14 An explicit derivation of this welfare result is contained in the appendix. 15 Indeed, for any ERP policy for which the …rm does not export (i.e. for all < ), home is strictly better o¤ not imposing any ERP constraint on the …rm at all (i.e. setting a higher than which allows the …rm to charge its optimal monopoly prices in both markets): while the …rm charges p m H at home both when < and when , it only exports when under the latter scenario where home's ERP policy is so lax that the …rm's pricing behavior is completely unconstrained.
price discrimination (i.e. e = > 1) on the part of the …rm. 16 The logic behind this result is simple. In terms of home welfare, imposing an ERP policy that makes the …rm abandon exporting is even worse than not having an ERP policy whatsoever -in both cases the …rm makes monopoly pro…t m H in the home market but only in the latter case does the …rm collect monopoly pro…t m F in the foreign market. The optimal ERP policy of the home government ensures that the …rm does not refrain from exporting just so that it can charge its optimal monopoly price at home. 17 When , the foreign market is fairly comparable to the domestic one and the …rm does not drop it even if it has to charge the same price in both markets (i.e. e = 1) since is global pro…t under the ERP policy exceeds monopoly pro…t at home. But when > , the …rm is only willing to export if it can engage in some price discrimination and the larger is , the more lax home's ERP policy needs to be to preserve the …rm's export incentive. In general, the …rm's export incentive is too weak relative to what is domestically optimal since the …rm cares only about its total pro…t and not where it comes from. By contrast, the home government also cares about the source of that pro…t in the sense that any pro…t increase enjoyed by the …rm that comes at the expense of domestic consumers does not increase total domestic welfare.
Given that home's ERP policy a¤ects the …rm's export incentive as well as the price it sets abroad, we now investigate the properties of the jointly optimal ERP policy.
Joint welfare
Let joint welfare be de…ned by: 16 It is worth noting here that Proposition 2 continues to describe the Nash equilibrium if the home country and the …rm were to make their decisions simultaneously. 17 Suppose the home government attaches greater weight to the …rm's pro…t relative to local consumer surplus home so that its ERP policy is chosen to maximize H + cs H where 1. Under such a scenario, we can show that
> 0 -i.e. the marginal return from tightening the ERP policy (i.e. lowering ) decreases in the weight given to the …rm's pro…t. Alternatively, we can show that
where b > 1. Thus, if the home country were to put a su¢ ciently large weight on pro…ts relative to consumer surplus (i.e. > b ) it would set a more lax ERP policy than the export inducing policy . Moreover, the optimal ERP policy is an increasing function of and it converges to its upper-bound when tends to in…nity.
Joint welfare as a function of the home's ERP policy equals
Lemma 1 showed that an interior ERP policy (i.e. 2 (1; )) lowers global sales relative to international price discrimination so that its imposition has two con ‡icting e¤ects on world welfare: it reduces the international price di¤erential across markets but also lowers total global sales relative to unrestricted price discrimination. What is the net e¤ect?
Lemma 2 provides the answer:
Lemma 2: Given that the …rm sells in both markets when facing an ERP policy at home, joint welfare increases as the home's ERP policy becomes tighter:
The literature on the exhaustion of intellectual property rights in the global economy has shown that the scenario of uniform pricing ( = 1) yields higher global welfare than international price discrimination ( ) because it fully eliminates the price di¤erential across countries that exists under price discrimination without lowering total global sales.
What Lemma 2 shows is that home's ERP policy -regardless of its level -increases global welfare relative to unrestricted price discrimination. In other words, any degree of reduction in the international price discrimination is welfare-improving because it allocates sales away from low valuation (foreign consumers) to high valuation (home consumers).
The jointly optimal ERP policy maximizes
We …rst state the key result and then explain its logic.
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Proposition 3: Home's nationally optimal ERP policy e maximizes joint welfare. 18 Note that home welfare jumps from w m H to w H at = . It is straightforward to show that the size of this welfare jump is increasing in :
19 We should note here that the result stated in Proposition 3 rests on the assumption that the foreign country is policy inactive. Section 3.4 derives the jointly optimal ERP policy when the foreign country responds to home's ERP policy via a local price control. This jointly optimal ERP policy di¤ers from the one chosen by home in equilibrium (see Proposition 4 and the ensuing discussion). Proposition 3 is rather surprising since it argues that home's (subgame perfect) Nash equilibrium ERP policy is e¢ cient in the sense of maximizing aggregate welfare even though home chooses its policy without taking into account its e¤ects on foreign consumers. We now explain the logic behind this result.
An e¢ cient ERP policy has to balance two objectives. One, it has to lower the international price di¤erential as much as possible since the existence of such a di¤erential implies that the marginal consumer in the high-price country values the last unit sold more than the marginal consumer in the low-price country so reallocating sales towards the high-price country raises welfare. Two, the ERP policy must ensure that foreign consumers have access to the good. For , the …rm exports even when it must charge the same price in both markets so that it is socially optimal to fully eliminate the international price di¤erential (i.e. set = 1). For > , incentivizing the …rm to export requires that it be given some leeway to price discriminate internationally.
To see why maximizes joint welfare when > , simply note that starting at lowering (i.e. making the ERP policy more stringent) reduces foreign welfare to zero since the …rm does not export while it also reduces home welfare since domestic price increases from p H to p is raised) the …rm continues to export but increases its price at home while lowering it abroad. Thus, starting at , an increase in makes the foreign country better o¤ while making home worse o¤. Indeed, from the foreign country's viewpoint it would be optimal to eliminate the ERP constraint since that yields the lowest possible price in its market (i.e. p m F ). However, we know from Lemma 2 that joint welfare declines in for all > . Thus, it is jointly optimal to lower the international price di¤erential as much as possible while simultaneously ensuring that foreign consumers do not lose access to the patented product. This is exactly what home's equilibrium ERP policy e accomplishes.
-[ Figure 1 here] - Figure 1 provides further intuition regarding Proposition 3. It illustrates why is jointly optimal for the case where > . For 2 [1; ), the …rm does not export and foreign welfare is zero so that joint welfare simply equals domestic welfare which does not depend on (when the …rm only sells at home). The horizontal line shows that for < , w = w H . If home's ERP policy is relaxed beyond , the …rm starts to export and joint welfare w exceeds home welfare w H by the amount w F . However, as the …gure shows, both home welfare and joint welfare decline with further increases in so that it is jointly optimal to not increase beyond .
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At the equilibrium ERP policy the price in the foreign market equals
Observe that since n 1, we have p F p m F -i.e. the price in the foreign market under the equilibrium ERP policy implemented by home exceeds the price that the …rm would have charged abroad in the absence of an ERP policy.
A well-known result in the existing literature is that for price discrimination to welfare dominate uniform pricing, a necessary (but not su¢ cient) condition is that the total output under discrimination be higher (Varian, 1985) . As Lemma 1 notes, the total global output of the …rm under price discrimination is indeed higher than that which it produces when facing an ERP constraint -i.e. the reduction in foreign sales caused by the ERP constraint exceeds the increase in home sales. However, it turns out that the positive e¤ect of the ERP constraint on global welfare that arises due to a reduction in the international price di¤erential dominates the negative e¤ect of reduced global sales so that it is jointly optimal to restrain price discrimination to the lowest level that is necessary for ensuring that foreign consumers do not go unserved. 21 While our benchmark model is useful for clarifying the mechanics of ERP policies, it does not address two important issues. First, it assumes that the foreign country's government is policy inactive. This is a potentially important shortcoming since the use of an ERP policy by home generates a negative price spillover for the foreign country, thereby creating an incentive for it to resort to a price control. Second, the benchmark model is silent on when and why a government would prefer to use an ERP policy over a standard price control. As we will show below, allowing the foreign government to directly control 20 When , the …rm exports regardless of the ERP policy at home and in this case the discontinuity in Figure 1 disappears: domestic welfare and total welfare both monotonically decline in so that it is socially optimal to set = 1 (which is what the home country does in equilibrium). 21 Under alternative assumptions regarding the structure of demand in the two markets, total output could very well be lower under price discrimination. Under such a situation, the ERP constraint is more likely to improve welfare since both e¤ects (i.e. the reduction in the international price di¤erential and the increase in global sales caused by it) would reinforce each other. See Schmalensee (1981).
the price in its market not only allows us to understand the interaction between domestic ERP policy and the foreign price control but it also sheds light on the issue of when and why home prefers to use an ERP policy over a domestic price control.
ERP policy with a foreign price control
While price controls can take various forms, we model the foreign price control in the simplest possible manner: the foreign government directly sets the patented product's price (p F ) in its market. Since the foreign country is a pure consumer of the patented good, its objective is to secure access to the good at the lowest possible price. If home does not impose an ERP policy, it is optimal for the foreign country to set the price control equal to the …rm's marginal cost (i.e. p F = 0). In the absence of an ERP policy at home, the …rm is willing to export for any foreign price greater than or equal to its marginal cost, and this allows the foreign country to impose its most desirable price control. Since the existence of an ERP policy at home causes the foreign price control to partly spill over to the home market thereby making the …rm more reluctant to export, home's ERP policy undermines the e¤ectiveness of the foreign price control.
To fully explore the nature of interaction between home's ERP policy and the foreign country's price control, we analyze the following three-stage game:
22 At the …rst stage, home chooses its ERP policy . 23 Next, foreign sets its local price control p F . 24 Finally, the …rm chooses its domestic price p H .
Pricing and export decision
As usual, we solve the game by backward induction. At the last stage, if the …rm chooses to export, it sets p H to maximize aggregate pro…t while being subject to an ERP policy at 22 In section 6.1 we discuss the case where countries simultaneously choose their respective policies. As we show below, the simultaneous case is relatively tedious and our main insights emerge more sharply in the sequential policy game described above. 23 In section 4.1 we analyze a scenario where home chooses between a domestic price control and an ERP policy and describe circumstances under which each of the policies is preferable to the other -see Proposition 6. 24 The foreign price control can also be thought of as the foreign government purchasing the good from the …rm at the price p F on behalf of local consumers. In section 4.2 we extend this analysis to a situation where the …rm and the foreign government bargain over price (as opposed to the foreign government having the power to determine it unilaterally).
home and a price control abroad:
Assuming that the ERP constraint p H p F binds, the solution to the above problem requires the …rm to set p H = p F so that its total pro…t equals:
In other words, when the …rm faces an ERP policy at home and a price control abroad, it essentially has no freedom to choose prices if it opts to export: it charges p F abroad and p F at home. If the …rm chooses not to export, it charges its optimal monopoly price at home and earns m H . Thus, when facing a price control abroad and an ERP policy at home, the …rm exports i¤
Substituting the formulae for the two pro…t functions, this inequality binds at
This equation can be solved for the threshold ERP policy (i.e. the ERP policy above which the …rm exports) as a function of the foreign price control:
Note that in the complete absence of policy intervention, the …rm would charge its monopoly price p m F in the foreign market, which serves as the natural upper bound for p F in the absence of an ERP policy at home. However, when an ERP policy is in place at home and it binds, the foreign price exceeds the monopoly level (i.e. p F p m F ). Thus, in the presence of an ERP policy at home, the natural upper bound for the foreign price control is the choke-o¤ price p F = 1.
Lemma 3:
The threshold ERP policy (p F ) has the following properties:
25 It will turn out that the ERP constraint necessarily binds in equilibrium. 26 Observe that the ERP constraint necessarily binds so long as p m H p F which is the same as b (p F ) p m H =p F . Now observe that the ERP policy that induces the …rm to export can be written as
which implies that the export inducing ERP policy necessarily binds. A detailed derivation of the expression for (p F ) reported in equation (11) is contained in the appendix.
Proof: see appendix.
-[ Figure 2 here] -
The …rst part of Lemma 3 says that if the foreign price control lies in the interval 0 p F < p F a tightening of the price control requires a relaxation of home's ERP policy if the …rm is to continue to export. When p F < p F , the foreign price control is below the …rm's optimal price for the foreign market and a tightening of the price control lowers the …rm's global pro…t under exporting, so the home's ERP policy has to be relaxed to o¤set the negative e¤ect on the …rm's incentive to export. This result is noteworthy since it shows that, over the range 0 p F < p F , the foreign price control generates an international spillover by reducing the range of ERP policies that home can implement without undermining its …rm's export incentive. Indeed, (p F ) tends to in…nity as p F falls to zero:
an extremely stringent price control (p F 0) translates into a zero home price for any …nite , so that there exists no feasible ERP policy that can provide the …rm su¢ cient incentive to export.
The second part of Lemma 3 says that (p F ) is convex in p F , indicating that the home's ERP policy must adjust to a larger extent as the price control abroad becomes stricter.
This property of (p F ) plays an important role in determining the jointly optimal pair of policies, an issue that we address in section 3.4 below.
Part (iii) of Lemma 3 points out that even if the foreign price control is set at the …rm's optimal monopoly price (i.e. p F = p m F ) for that market, the export inducing ERP policy (p m F ) is more lax than the policy that is chosen by home in the absence of a price control ( ). The intuition for this is that in the absence of a foreign price control, under the export inducing policy the foreign price actually exceeds the …rm's optimal monopoly price abroad (i.e. p F > p m F ) so that a foreign price control set at p m F actually binds for the …rm.
Foreign best response
Given the home's ERP policy, the foreign country picks the lowest possible price control that just induces the …rm to export. For p F 2 [0; p F ] since the (p F
Equilibrium ERP policy
Since home has the …rst move, it chooses its most preferred point on the downward sloping part of the (p F ) curve in Figure 2 . For any ERP policy below this curve, the …rm does not export so home welfare is at its lowest possible level whereas for any policy above the curve, home welfare can be increased by lowering : doing so lowers the home price without compromising the …rm's export incentive. The following result is useful for understanding the equilibrium ERP policy chosen by home: 
Over this range, a reduction in the foreign price requires home to make its ERP policy less stringent (@ (p F )=@p F < 0) to ensure that the …rm's export incentive is preserved. But since (p F )=@p F is relatively small in magnitude in this region, the direct
Thus, both countries gain from a tighter foreign price control when p F 2 (p 
This ERP policy is Pareto-e¢ cient and it induces foreign to set its price control at the …rm's optimal monopoly price ( p 
whereas it increases with it for p F 2 (p m F ; p F ) so that, subject to the …rm exporting, home price is minimized at point H. Intuitively, since the …rm has the strongest incentive to export when its foreign price equals the optimal monopoly price p . Thus, because it moves …rst, home is able to utilize the foreign price control to obtain a level of welfare that cannot be achieved in its absence.
Since the equilibrium foreign price equals p m F , from the viewpoint of foreign consumers the equilibrium outcome coincides with that which obtains when the …rm is completely free to price discriminate across markets. Even though the …rm charges its optimal monopoly price p m F abroad when home implements the policy m , the ability of home to commit to an ERP policy makes foreign consumers better o¤ relative to the case where there the foreign price control is absent because the foreign price under is strictly higher than that under m (i.e. p F > p m F ). Further note that as Figure 2 shows m > : i.e. home's most preferred ERP policy in the presence of a foreign price control is more lax than its ERP policy when there is no price control abroad. The intuition for this result is clear: absent the foreign price control, the …rm raises its price abroad to p F (which exceeds p m F ) forcing home to set a stricter ERP policy to keep the domestic price low while preserving the …rm's export incentive.
Welfare: jointly optimal policies
It is clear that a jointly optimal pair of policies must lie on the (p F ) curve in Figure 2 .
Any combination of policies above this curve lowers welfare by widening the international price di¤erential while any policy pair below the curve has the same e¤ect by inducing the …rm to not export. Furthermore, from Lemma 4 it is also clear that any jointly optimal price control has to lie in the range (0; p m F ]. The jointly optimal pair of policies solves the following problem
Substituting (p F ) into (12) and maximizing over p F yields the jointly optimal price control:
where
Observe that p
Since 0 < (n; ) 1, the jointly optimal price control is strictly smaller than the …rm's monopoly price for the foreign market (i.e. p w F < p m F ). Indeed, (n; ) measures the percentage reduction in the …rm's monopoly price abroad that is jointly optimal to impose.
Since (n; ) is decreasing in n as well as , the more lucrative the …rm's domestic market (i.e. the higher are n or ), the less binding is the foreign price control. When either n or become arbitrarily large, (n; ) approaches 0 so that it becomes jointly optimal to let the …rm charge its monopoly price in the foreign market. The jointly optimal ERP policy w can be recovered by substituting p F = p w F in equation (11) . Since p w F < p m F we must have w > , i.e., the jointly optimal ERP policy in the presence of an optimally chosen foreign price control is more lax than when the foreign price control is absent. Thus, the foreign price control makes it possible to implement a more lax ERP policy provided the two countries coordinate their policies.
Finally, observe that home's equilibrium ERP policy m is more stringent than the welfare maximizing policy w (i.e. w > m ) because it ignores the e¤ect of its decision on 28 It is easy to verify that the second-order condition holds at p F .
foreign consumers. The welfare maximizing policy pair (p w F ; w ) is denoted as point W in Figure 2 and, for reasons explained above, it lies Northwest of the equilibrium point H.
Further analysis
In this section, we consider two important extensions of the policy game analyzed in section 2. We …rst expand the menu of policies available to the home country by allowing it to choose between a direct price control and an ERP policy. Next, we extend the policy game to allow for a scenario where the foreign price is determined by bargaining between the …rm and the foreign government as opposed to being set unilaterally by one party.
An ERP policy or a price control?
Thus far, our analysis has ignored the possibility that home might prefer a domestic price control to an ERP policy. We now extend the model to directly address this issue. Suppose at the …rst stage of the policy game home can choose between setting an ERP policy ( ) or a price control p H with the rest of stages of the game remaining the same as in the three-stage policy game described at the beginning of section 3.
We know from our previous analysis that if home uses an ERP policy then the equi- . Now consider the equilibrium outcome if home chooses a domestic price control. Unlike an ERP policy, a domestic price control does not a¤ect the …rm's foreign price and thus has no bearing on its decision to export. Therefore, in the second stage, foreign simply chooses the lowest price at which the …rm is willing to sell in its market (i.e. it sets p F = 0 to maximize local consumer surplus). At the …rst stage of the game, home sets its price control to maximize its welfare knowing that the local price does not a¤ect the …rm's decision to export. Like foreign, home too …nds its optimal to set the price control equal to the marginal cost of production (i.e. it sets p H = 0). Thus, when both countries use a price control, price equals marginal cost in each market and the …rm makes zero pro…ts. Let home welfare under p H = 0 = p F be denoted by w 0 H and …rm pro…ts in market i by
From the perspective of home welfare, the trade-o¤ between an ERP policy and a local price control boils down to the following: while a price control yields greater domestic surplus (de…ned as the sum of consumer surplus and …rm's home pro…t), an ERP policy helps the …rm earn greater pro…t abroad since the equilibrium price in the foreign market under the equilibrium ERP policy m ends up being the optimal monopoly price p 
Then, home prefers the ERP policy m to the price control
0 which is the same as
where H + cs H 0 (i.e. the higher pro…t in the home market under its optimal ERP policy m relative to the price control p H = 0 is more than o¤set by the accompanying loss in consumer surplus). Simplifying the the above inequality yields the following:
The home country prefers an ERP policy to a domestic price control
This result sheds useful light on when and why a country might prefer an ERP policy to a domestic price control. If an ERP policy is in place at home, for all p F p m F a stricter foreign price control translates into a lower home price (holding constant the ERP policy) and lower global pro…t for the home …rm, something that tends to make exporting less attractive to the …rm. Recognizing this link between prices in the two markets created by home's ERP policy, foreign is willing to push down its own price control only so far when home's price regulation takes the form of an ERP policy as opposed to a price control.
In contrast, when home implements a price control rather than an ERP policy, there is no link between prices in the two markets and the foreign government is free to set its price control at marginal cost without a¤ecting the …rm's decision to export. While this outcome is desirable from the viewpoint of foreign consumers, it is not in the interest of the …rm since it makes zero pro…ts abroad when the foreign price control equals its marginal cost. An ERP policy can dominate a price control from the perspective of home welfare when the foreign market is not too di¤erent in size from the home own market so that the higher foreign pro…t ( F ) under an ERP policy dominates the loss in domestic surplus ( H + cs H ) created by it relative to a price control. When > (n) the home market is signi…cantly more lucrative for the …rm than the foreign market and home's incentive to extract pro…t from foreign consumers is trumped by the loss in domestic surplus it su¤ers under an ERP policy relative to a local price control. 29 It is worth noting that from home's perspective an ERP policy is dominated by a domestic price control when the …rm does not face a price control abroad, i.e., w H ( ; p F ) < w 0 H . The logic for why the presence of a foreign price control makes it more attractive for home to use an ERP policy is as follows. First, recall that the …rm is willing to export for all foreign price controls and ERP policy combinations that lie on the (p F ) curve. Second, in the presence of a foreign price control (p F ), home can take advantage of the fact that the foreign government will set its price control p F so as to ensure that the …rm sells in its market. By contrast, in the absence of a foreign price control, home has to preserve the …rm's export incentive entirely on its own. As a result, in the absence of the foreign price control, the only point on the (p F ) that is accessible to home is the pair ( ; p F ) whereas in the presence of an endogenously determined foreign price control, home can obtain any pair of policies on the (p F ) curve as an equilibrium outcome. This wider choice set allows home to pick its most preferred point on the (p F ) curve. Furthermore, we know from Lemma 3(i) that home welfare strictly increases as we move along the (p F ) curve from point E towards point H (where it reaches its maximum value): as we move up the (p F ) curve from point E towards point H, the total pro…t of the home …rm remains unchanged (equals m H ) whereas home price (p H ) falls so that total domestic welfare increases.
Price bargaining
We now discuss the case where the foreign government and the …rm bargain over price.
The timing of moves is as follows. First, home chooses its ERP policy ( ). Next, the …rm and the foreign government bargain over the …rm's foreign price (p F ). We utilize the Nash bargaining solution as the outcome of the bargaining subgame. We …rst examine bargaining in the absence of side-payments and then consider the case where side-payments are possible between the two parties so that the price in the foreign market is chosen to maximize their joint surplus. We show that, from the perspective of home, an ERP policy can dominate a domestic price control under both scenarios. 29 Observe that (n) is decreasing in n. This makes intuitive sense: as the home market becomes larger relative to the foreign market (i.e. as n increases) , the ERP policy becomes less attractive relative to a price control because domestic consumer surplus is proportional to n.
Nash bargaining
It is clear that, given the ERP policy set by home, the range of prices over which the …rm and the foreign government can …nd a mutually acceptable price is given by [p F ( ), p F ( )] where the p F ( ) is the foreign government's most preferred price since it maximizes local consumer surplus cs F (p) (subject to the price being high enough to induce the …rm to export) whereas p F ( ) is that of the …rm since it maximizes its global pro…t G (p F ; ) where
The price under Nash bargaining solves 
Using the relevant formulae, this …rst order condition can be rewritten as
It is straightforward to show that the solution to this equation is a price p
Now consider home's ERP policy decision. Home sets its ERP policy taking into account the price p F ( ; ) that emerges from the bargaining that follows its decision. When = 1, the home's ERP policy is given by point H in Figure 2 . In this case, the …rm has zero bargaining power and the foreign government e¤ectively controls the price. As a result, home's most preferred policy ensures that the …rm ends up charging its optimal monopoly price p m F abroad and therefore has the strongest incentive to export. When = 0, the …rm is free to pick any price abroad and home sets a much more stringent ERP policy with the equilibrium policy outcome being given by point E in Figure 2 . When bargaining power is split between the two parties, the …rm earns strictly positive rents in the bargaining subgame and p F ( ; ) > p F . At the …rst stage, home simply chooses its most preferred point on the (p F ) curve which will generally lie Northwest of point E.
Consider now the impact of bargaining on home's choice between an ERP policy and a local price control. We know from previous analysis that when = 0 (i.e. when the home …rm is free to set its foreign price) a domestic price control dominates an ERP policy whereas when = 1 (i.e. foreign has all the bargaining power) an ERP policy dominates a price control if the countries are su¢ ciently alike (see Proposition 5) . This suggests that the case for an ERP policy relative to a price control is likely to be stronger when the bargaining power of the domestic …rm is lower. While analytical derivations are cumbersome, we have numerically con…rmed this insight and illustrate in Table 1 below. 30 The last column of this table shows home's welfare gain (in percentage terms) from replacing the optimally chosen price control by the optimal ERP policy. The table illustrates that as the foreign government's bargaining power increases, the foreign price decreases and even though the home country relaxes its ERP policy, the price at home also falls. Furthermore, the higher the bargaining power of the foreign government, the smaller the amount by which domestic surplus under an ERP surplus falls short of he domestic surplus under a local price control and the higher the amount by which the …rm's foreign pro…t under an ERP policy at home exceeds its foreign pro…t when it faces a price control at home. Perhaps most importantly, home prefers an ERP policy to a price control (i.e. w H > 0) when its …rm's bargaining position is weak relative to the foreign government (i.e. when is higher). Additional insight into the home country's choice between an ERP policy can be obtained by examining how this choice is a¤ected by changes in -the key demand parameter that nails down the domestic monopoly price and therefore the relative pro…tability of the 30 For the calculations presented in Table 1 , we set n = 1 and = 4:
two markets from the …rm's perspective. Table 2 shows that as increases, the loss in domestic surplus caused by an ERP policy relative to a price control increases whereas the gain in foreign pro…t experienced by the …rm decreases. 31 As a result, the home country's welfare under an ERP policy exceeds that under a price control only when is not too large (i.e. foreign demand is relatively similar to domestic demand). 
If side-payments are possible
Now consider the case where side payments are possible between the two parties so that the foreign price p F is chosen to maximize their joint welfare. 32 In other words, given home's ERP policy , the foreign price is chosen to maximize the sum of the …rm's global pro…t and consumer surplus in the foreign market:
The solution to the above problem is described in the following lemma:
Lemma 5: (i) Given home's ERP policy, the joint surplus S(p F ; ) of the foreign government and the …rm is maximized by setting
The jointly optimal price p b F ( ) has intuitive properties. As the home market becomes more lucrative for the …rm (either due to an increase in n or ), the two parties agree to set a higher price in the foreign market. The non-monotonicity of p b F ( ) in described in part (ii) of Lemma 5 can be understood as follows: when is small (i.e. near 1), the price in the home market is quite far from the …rm's optimal home price p m H so that its global pro…t is well below its maximum value. Starting at ' 1, the jointly optimal foreign price p b F ( ) increases in order to raise the …rm's pro…t even though consumer surplus in the South declines. But once hits the threshold value of B , the jointly optimal foreign price decreases with because the relatively lax ERP policy allows the …rm to charge a fairly high price in the home market even though the foreign price is low. Note that p b F ( ) goes to zero as approaches in…nity -i.e. if there is no ERP policy at home, the two parties agree to set price equal to marginal cost since doing so maximizes their joint surplus.
The …rm's price at home equals p
It is straightforward to show that dp
i.e. the price in home increases as home's ERP policy becomes more lax. Thus, a relaxation of the home's ERP policy makes domestic consumers worse o¤ even when the foreign price maximizes the joint welfare of the …rm and the foreign government. Furthermore, we have
Since m H is independent of , this implies that the joint surplus available to the …rm and the foreign government from reaching agreement over the price p b F ( ) is higher when the home's ERP policy is looser. The intuition is straightforward: the …rm's global pro…t as well as consumer surplus abroad increase when it has greater freedom to price discriminate internationally.
We assume that the bargaining process is such that the two parties agree to allocate the joint surplus created abroad at price p b F ( ) in the following manner: they …rst give each party a share of the total surplus that equals its payo¤ under disagreement and then share the remaining surplus between themselves with 2 [0; 1] denoting the share of the foreign government. Since the …rm's pro…t under no agreement equals m H , its payo¤ from reaching agreement with the foreign government under which it sells in the foreign market at price
while that of the foreign government equals
Observe that for foreign sales to raise the total surplus available to the two parties and for the …rm to prefer selling in both markets at price p i.e. we have:
i.e. if home's ERP policy is any tighter than b then the …rm is unwilling to sell abroad.
33
The home government chooses its ERP policy to maximize local welfare taking into account the e¤ect of its policy on the outcome of the bargaining process. It solves:
H it follows that home will never set below b . Furthermore, it is straightforward to show that
i.e. given that the …rm sells abroad at p b F ( ), home welfare declines in its ERP policy . Thus, in equilibrium, home sets its ERP policy at b . We have:
Proposition 6: Suppose the …rm and the foreign government choose the foreign price p F to maximize their joint welfare S(p F ; ). Then, regardless of how the total surplus is split between the two parties, home's optimal ERP policy is b at which the …rm is indi¤erent between selling only at home (at its optimal monopoly price p In what follows, we focus on the case where is satis…ed. When < , the e¢ cient ERP policy is a corner solution (i.e. b = 1). We can show that even when b = 1 there exist parameter values for which home prefers an ERP policy to a local price control. in a more stringent ERP policy even though they make the foreign country worse o¤ relative to a situation where the price is chosen unilaterally by the …rm. Intuitively, when price is not negotiated, home is limited in its ability to extract rent from the …rm and the foreign country since, as argued earlier, the bargained price in the absence of transfers must lie in
Finally, consider the comparison between an ERP policy and a domestic price control p H when the …rm and the foreign government choose the price to maximize their joint surplus. Given p H , the …rm and the foreign government choose p F to solve:
Given that the …rm's home pro…t H (p H ) is independent of the foreign price p F , the solution to the problem in (21) is to set p F = 0, i.e., when prices in the two markets are not linked -as is the case in the absence of an ERP policy at home -total surplus available to the two parties from the foreign market is maximized by setting price equal to marginal cost.
In the absence of an ERP policy, there is no link between prices in the two markets. As a result, when home uses a price control p H , the …rm's payo¤ equals:
We are now ready to consider home's price control decision at the …rst stage of the game. It chooses its price control p H to maximize
Since S F (0) is independent of p H , the above problem is the same as 
In other words, once again, an ERP policy dominates price control when countries are similar enough, i.e. < b . Note that b is increasing in , meaning that, once again, an ERP policy is more likely to dominate a price control when the foreign government's bargaining power is high.
Conclusion
This paper sheds light on the economics of external reference pricing (ERP) and how such a policy interacts with price controls abroad. We consider a model in which a single …rm sells a patented product in potentially two markets (home and foreign) where, owing to di¤erences in the structure of demand across countries, it has an incentive to price discriminate in favor of foreign consumers.
We model home's ERP policy as the degree to which the …rm's foreign price is allowed to be lower than its domestic price and show that home's optimal policy is to tolerate a level of international price discrimination at which the …rm is just willing to sell abroad. In other words, home balances the interests of local consumers against the export incentive of the …rm. Intuitively, an ERP policy that is so stringent that it becomes pro…t maximizing for the …rm to not sell abroad in order to charge its optimal monopoly price at home is never optimal for home. This result helps de…ne the limits of ERP policies and it suggests that countries with large domestic markets (such as the USA or Germany) should use relatively less stringent ERP polices or else they can risk creating a situation where their …rms choose to not sell abroad just so that they can charge high prices at home.
Almost by design, home's ERP policy generates a negative price spillover for foreign consumers in our model. However, quite surprisingly, we …nd that home's optimal ERP 34 This welfare comparison applies for the case where the parameter values are such that the ERP policy b is not at a corner solution (i.e. b > 1). As we noted earlier, this requires that . Even when this condition fails (i.e. < so that b = 1) we can show that home can still prefer the ERP policy b to a domestic price control set at the …rm's marginal cost (p H = 0). policy maximizes aggregate welfare even though it sets the policy not taking into account the interests of foreign consumers. Intuitively, since the home market is larger and its consumers have a greater willingness to pay for the …rm's product, it is jointly optimal to reduce international price discrimination to the lowest possible level subject to the …rm selling in both markets. This is exactly what home's nationally optimal ERP policy accomplishes in equilibrium. This result suggests that while ERP policies create international price spillovers, their use does not necessarily create an argument for international coordination. It is noteworthy in this regard that the TRIPS agreement of the WTO is silent on the subject of ERP policies for patented products and it also leaves member countries free to adopt exhaustion policies of their choosing, another type of policy that creates international price spillovers via the ‡ow of parallel trade across countries.
Another insight provided by the model is that home's ERP policy reduces the e¤ective-ness of the foreign price control since it increases the minimum price at which the home …rm is willing to export. On the ‡ip side, the presence of an ERP policy at home leads the foreign price control to generate an international spillover for home consumers although the nature of this spillover is not necessarily negative. Indeed, we demonstrate that there exist circumstances where a tighter foreign price control raises welfare in both countries.
Furthermore, our welfare analysis shows that it is jointly optimal to restrict the …rm's foreign price below its optimal monopoly price for that market while simultaneously granting it greater room to price discriminate internationally than home is willing to provide in the absence of a price control abroad.
While our model delivers several important insights, it does make certain speci…c assumptions (such as linear demand) in order to make su¢ cient analytical progress on key questions of interest. Nevertheless, we believe that the key driving force of the model -i.e. each country wants to secure access to the patented product at the lowest possible price taking the …rm's incentives into account -is fairly general. Similarly, the insight that an ERP policy can be preferable to a local price control when the …rm is subject to a foreign price control or is in a weak bargaining position abroad rests on a key aspect of an ERP policy that should continue to hold in a more general setting -i.e. unlike a local price control, an ERP policy links prices internationally and this can help the …rm secure a more attractive price and therefore greater pro…t abroad.
Appendix

Derivation of (p F )
Here we show that
To simplify exposition, let x = p F and y = . The …rm is indi¤erent between exporting and selling only at home whenever:
which can be rewritten as
Dividing both sides by nx 2 = gives:
This is a quadratic equation in y and the relevant solution is given by
which is the same as y = 2x r (1 x) nx which can be rewritten as
which implies
Alternative timing assumptions
Suppose the two countries set their respective policies simultaneously: home sets its ERP policy while foreign sets its price control p F . It is clear that given p F the optimal ERP for home is the threshold policy (p F ). We now characterize foreign's optimal price control given home's ERP policy. If the …rm does not export, foreign has no access to the good and its welfare equals zero. Moreover, conditional on the …rm exporting, a more lax price control is counter-productive as it simply raises the local price. Hence, for a given ERP policy, foreign picks the lowest possible price control that just induces the …rm to export. Figure 2 ) is a Nash equilibrium. We can state the following: 
tightening of the foreign price control (i.e. a reduction in p F ) lowers the home price through the adjustment of home's ERP policy whereas when the price control is relatively stringent
, a further reduction in p F raises the home price. The response of home's ERP policy to changes in the foreign price control (described in Lemma 3) is crucial to understanding the non-monotonicity of p H (p F ). To see why, note that
so that if @ (p F )=@p F 0 then the home price would necessarily increase with the foreign price control since (p F ) > 0. However, as Lemma 3 notes @ (p F )=@p F < 0 whenever 0 < p F < p F , i.e., for this range of the foreign price control, home tightens its ERP policy as the foreign price control relaxes. This adjustment in the home's ERP policy tends to reduce the home price p H . Next, note that since
0, the home's ERP policy adjusts to a larger extent when the foreign price control is stricter. Indeed, we can see this more directly by considering the elasticity of home's ERP policy with respect to the foreign price control, which is de…ned as
It is straightforward to show that
As a result, the home price declines in p F for all p F 2 (0; p m F ] whereas it increases with it for p F 2 (p m F ; p F ). The last statement of Proposition 7 says that as p F ! 0 the home price converges to the monopoly price p m H . This is because home has to completely drop its ERP policy (i.e. (p F ) tends to +1) when p F ! 0 in order to maintain the …rm's export incentive.
We have shown that when the two countries set their policies simultaneously there exist a continuum of Nash equilibria that constitute the downward sloping part of the (p F ) curve. Of course, as is clear from our analysis in section 3, these equilibria have rather di¤erent welfare properties. 35 Furthermore, the …rm's total pro…t does not play a role in determining the relative welfare ranking of these equilibria since in all Nash equilibria the …rm's pro…t equals its monopoly pro…t under no exporting ( m H ), i.e., the …rm is indi¤erent between selling only at home and selling in both markets. From Lemma 4 we know that all Nash equilibria for which p F 2 (p p F ' 0) knowing that home will then impose no ERP policy on the …rm in order to induce it to export. Price at home would then equal the optimal monopoly price p m F . Thus, the outcome when foreign chooses the price before home chooses its ERP policy coincides with that which obtains when home has no ERP policy in place at all.
Optimal reference basket in a three-country scenario
Suppose there are three countries: A, B and C and let A B C = 1. In what follows, we derive the optimal reference basket of country A. When setting its ERP policy, country A has four options: it can include only country B, only country C, both countries B and C, or none of them in its reference basket. We denote the alternative reference baskets by R where R = fBg, fCg; fB; Cg, or f g. Country A's ERP policy requires that the …rm's price in its local market be no higher than the lowest price it charges among all countries included in its reference basket. As will be shown below, country A's optimal reference basket depends on the …rm's exporting decision, which in turn is a¤ected by the degree of symmetry across the three markets as captured by i .
When country A does not use any ERP policy (i.e. its policy is f g) the …rm can charge a monopoly price in each country. We can write the …rm's global pro…t in this case as the sum of its monopoly pro…ts across countries: We are now ready to derive country A's optimal reference basket.
In this case, fBg is dominated by f g. To see why, simply note that under R = fBg the …rm foregoes country B and charges monopoly prices in countries A and C, while under f g it charges monopoly prices in all countries. Thus the …rm's global pro…t is higher under f g, which also leads to higher welfare for country A. Analogously, it is easy to see that fCg is also dominated by f g. Therefore, country A has to e¤ectively choose between f g and fB; Cg. There are two sub-cases to be considered:
Under f g, country A's welfare is w m A . Now consider the case where country A's reference basket is fB; Cg. In this case, the …rm has three options: (i) export to both foreign countries charging p(AC) in countries A and C and p m B in country B or (ii) export to country B at price p(AB) and forego country C or (iii) sell only at home at its optimal monopoly price. Since A > 3 B , option (ii) is dominated by option (iii) from the …rm's perspective.
Moreover, it turns out that option (iii) also dominates option (i) when A > 3 B . Therefore, A > 3 B , the …rm does not export to either market if country A sets its reference basket as fB; Cg. It follows then that country A prefers f g to fB; Cg.
In this case, if country A chooses fB; Cg the …rm again has three options as in sub-case 1.1, except that its option (i) now becomes charging the price p(ABC) in all countries.
Given that option (ii) is dominated, we only need to compare the …rm's global pro…t under options (i) and (iii). It is straightforward to show that the …rm prefers option (i) to option (iii) i¤ A < e A 8 B =( B + 1). Also note that country A's welfare is higher if the …rm exports to country B and C since this helps lowers the price at home. Therefore, country A chooses the reference basket fB; Cg over f g i¤ A e A . Case 2: 3 < A 3 B .
In this case, the …rm exports to country B if country A's reference basket is fBg.
Moreover, it is easy to see that from A's perspective fBg always dominates f g because it lowers price and improves consumer surplus at home. Thus, country A only has to decide between fBg and fB; Cg. To compare these choices, we need to consider two sub-cases. In this case, it can be shown that country A prefers fCg to fBg. The reason is that by referencing country C (as compared to B) an ERP policy can lead to a lower domestic price and thus higher consumer surplus in country A. To determine the optimal reference basket, country A needs to compare fCg and fB; Cg. As before, there are two sub-cases to consider.
Sub-case 3.1: p(AC) p m B .
As above under fB; Cg the …rm can (i) export to both foreign countries charging p(AC) in country A and C and p m B in country B or (ii) export to country B at price p(AB) and forego country C or (iii) sell only at home (i.e. country A) at p m B . Given the set of permissible parameters for sub-case 3.1, the …rm chooses option (i). Hence the reference baskets fCg and fB; Cg are equivalent in the sense that they induce the same pricing strategy by the …rm. As a result, country A is indi¤erent between fCg and fB; Cg. When p(AC) > p m B , under option (i) …rm charges p(ABC) in all countries under fB; Cg given it exports to both countries. Again, option (i) yields higher global pro…t to the …rm than options (ii) and (iii). Moreover, country A's welfare is higher under fB; Cg than fCg.
We can now state our main result: Proposition 8: Under an ERP policy set by country A that requires the …rm's price in its market to be no higher than the lowest price it charges in the other markets in which it sells its product, country A's optimal reference basket is characterized as follows:
(i) When A > 3 B and A > e A , country A's reference basket is empty (i.e. it is f g) and the …rm is free to price discriminate internationally.
(ii) When A 3 B and A > A , country A includes only country B in its reference basket and the …rm is free to set its optimal monopoly price in country C. Proposition 8 is illustrated in Figure 3 . As this …gure shows, when A is large relative to both B and C it is optimal for country A to not impose any ERP policy on its …rm (i.e.
its optimal reference basket is f g). When country A and B are similar in magnitude and both are large relative to C , it is optimal for country A to include only country B in its reference basket. Finally, when both B and C are similar in magnitude to A , it is optimal for country A to include both of them in its reference basket. Thus, the key insight of our two country model -i.e. the optimal ERP policy of the home country is more stringent when the markets of the two countries are relatively similar to each othercontinues to hold in a three-country setting.
Proof of Proposition 1
( . Next, note that b < 1 whenever < n + 2. But since we require 1, it follows immediately that whenever b < 1 we must have @p F @ < 0 for all permissible .
Now consider the case b 1 (which holds whenever n + 2). In this case we also must have 1. This is because = .
from which it follows that b if p n + 1 2, which requires n 3. But since n 1 this condition necessarily holds whenever n + 2. Thus, whenever b 1 we must have b . Since 
E¤ects of ERP on domestic welfare
Straightforward calculations yield @w H @ = n (n 2 3 + 3n 2 3n + 2n 2 + ) 4(n 2 + ) 3 .
Since n > 0 and 4(n 2 + ) 3 > 0, the sign of @w H @ is determined by the term g( ) n 2 3 + 3n 2 3n + 2n 2 + . It su¢ ces to show that g( ) > 0 for < . Now consider two cases depending on the value of .
First consider the case where > = 2 + 1 n (so that > 1).
In this case, we have g( = ) = (n +5)(n +1) 2 8n
> 0. To show g( ) > 0 for < it is su¢ cient to show g( ) is increasing in over < . To see this, note that > 0 for all < . It follows that g( ) is increasing in so that g( ) > 0 for all < .
Next consider the case where and p F = p F = n n +1
. It can be shown that f (p F ) > 0 at both these in ‡ection points. Continuity of f (p F ) implies that we must have f (p F ) > 0 and therefore
> 0 given > 1 or n > 1.
Further discussion of Proposition 4
(i) First consider the scenario where m > 1 which requires that > 1 (n) (2n + 1 + p 4n + 1)=2n. Recall from Proposition 4 that in this case ERP dominates PC if < (n) (2 p 2 + 3)=n. Thus, when > 1 (n), for the ERP policy to dominate a domestic price control we need 1 (n) < < (n) where (n) > 1 (n) i¤ n < n 2 + p 2. As a result, when home's ERP policy is not a corner solution (i.e. m > 1) the ERP policy dominates a price control i¤ 1 (n) < < (n) and n < n.
(ii) Now suppose m = 1 which happens whenever 1 (n). In this case, it can be shown that from home's perspective an ERP policy dominates a price control i¤ < e (n) p 2 n=2 + 2. Combining the condition 1 (n), we have that an ERP policy dominates a price control if 1 (n) and n < n or < e (n) and n > n. 
